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Abstract. The design of punishment policies applied to specific domains
linking agents actions to material penalties is an open research issue. The
proposed framework applies principles of contract law to set penalties: ex-
pectation damages, opportunity cost, reliance damages, and party design
remedies. In order to decide which remedy provides maximum welfare
within an electronic market, a simulation environment called DEMCA
(Designing Electronic Markets for Contractual Agents) was developed.
Knowledge representation and the reasoning capabilities of the agents
are based on an extended version of temporal defeasible logic.
Keywords: contractual agents, legal remedies, defeasible logic.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to [?], there are five different philosophies of punishment from which
all punishment policies can be derived: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
rehabilitation and restoration. Retribution considers that the remedy should be
as severe as the wrongful act, making this doctrine most suitable for multi-
agent systems. Consequently, we drive our attention toward four legal doctrines
from contract law that aim to equal the victim’s harm: expectation damages,
opportunity costs, reliance damages, and party designed remedies. The output
of this research formalizes the above remedies for multi-agent systems within a
framework for computing penalties for B2B disputes.
The remedies imposed by law affect the agents’ behaviour [?]: (1) searching
for trading partners; (2) negotiating exchanges; (3) keeping or breaking com-
mitments; (5) taking precaution against breach causing events; (6) acting based
on reliance on promises; (7) acting to mitigate damages caused by broken com-
mitments; (8) settle disputes caused by broken promises. In the supply chain
context a contract breach can propagate over the entire chain. The damages im-
posed by legal institutions can positively influence breach propagation. Usually,
a contract breach appears when some perturbation arises on the market1. The
1 For instance, the market price of a raw material could rise so much that, for the
agent who had planed to achieve it in order to produce an item, is more efficient to
breach the contract with its buyer.
question is which of the above remedies is adequate for an efficient functionality
of the electronic market. Since normative reasoning is defeasible by nature, we
developed a framework which provide defeasible reasoning capabilities for agents
to act in case of breach.
The problem in hand is approached by: (i) formalising contractual clauses
and contract law remedies for multi-agent systems; (ii) providing a system for
designing experiments in order to decide which legal doctrine suits an electronic
market; iii) providing defeasible logic-based mechanisms for enhancing reasoning
capabilities of the agents about penalties. The paper is organized as follows: The
next section introduces contracts within the task dependency network model.
Section 3 formalises four types of remedies for multi-agent systems according
to contract law. In section 4 the functions used by the market for penalties
are implemented. Section 5 describes the implemented system. Section 6 details
related work and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
2.1 Commitment Dependency Network
The task dependency network model [?], used in the analysis of the supply chain,
was adapted [?] as follows: commitment dependency network is a directed, acyclic
graph, (V,E), with vertices V = G∪A, where:G = the set of goods, A = S∪P∪C
the set of agents, S = the set of suppliers, P = the set of producers, C = the set
of consumers, and a set of edges E (commitments) connecting agents with their
input and output goods. With each agent a ∈ A we associate an input set Ia and
s1
s2 p1
p2
p3
p4
 p5
p6
c1
c2
c3
g1
g2
g3
g5
g6 g7
g4
s3
s4
s5
s6
Fig. 1. Task dependency network: goods are indicated by circles, suppliers and
consumers are represented by boxes, while producers by curved boxes.
an output set Oa: Ia = {g ∈ G| ≺ g, a ≻∈ E} and Oa = {g ∈ G| ≺ a, g ≻∈ E}.
Agent a is a supplier if Ia = ∅, a consumer if Oa = ∅, and a producer in all other
cases. Without any generalization lost, we consider that a consumer c ∈ C needs
a single item (|Ic| = 1) and every supplier s ∈ S or producer p ∈ P build one
single item (|Os| = 1 and |Op| = 1)
An agent must have a contract for all of its input goods in order to produce
its output, named presumable 2 and denoted by pˆ. If we note np = |Ip|, the agent
has to sign np + 1 contracts in order to be a member in the supply chain. For
each input good gk ∈ Ip the agent p bids its own item valuation vkp . The auction
for the good gk sets the transaction price at pk. The agent’s investments are
Ip =
∑np
k=1 pk where k are the winning input goods. We note by I
g
p the agent’s
investments but without considering the investments made for the current good
g. Similarly, we note all bids values submitted by the agent p as Vp =
∑np
k=1 v
k
p
and this value without considering the bid for good g as V gp . For the output good,
the agent p signs a contract at reliance price Rp. We consider that there are no
production costs and when perturbation or unexpected events occur, agents need
protocols for repairing or reforming the supply chain.
2.2 Contracts
By extending social commitments [?], we define a set of contractual patterns
used to declaratively specify the contracts signed between parties. The classical
definition of a conditional commitment states that a commitment is a promise
from a debtor x to a creditor y to bring about a particular sentence p under a
condition q. Starting from this definition we formalise a set of contractual clauses
inspired from contract law:
In a Gratuitous Promise the debtor x promises the creditor y to bring
about p until tmaturity without requesting anything: C
0
1
(x, y, 1, p1, tmaturity).
A Unilateral Contract involves an exchange of the offerer’s promise p for the
oferee’s act q, where the debtor x promises the creditor y to bring about p
until tmaturity if condition q holds at time tissue. For instance, in the contract
C =≺ as, ab, gi, Pc, tissue, tmaturity ≻, as represents the seller agent, ab the buyer
agent, gi the good or the transaction subject, Pc the contract price, tissue is the
time when the offer is accepted and tmaturity is the time when the transaction
occurs. In a Bilateral Contract both sides make promises, the debtor x promises
the creditor y to bring about p if the creditor y promises x to bring about p1,
formalised as C(x, y, C(y, x, 1, p1), p).
During its life cycle, a commitment may be in one of the following states: open
offer, active, released, breached, fulfilled, canceled, or failed, which are also useful
to be considered from a legal perspective. The state transition between open offer
and active contract depends on each type of commitment: the acceptance of a
gratuitous commitment means reliance and acting upon it, the acceptance of a
unilateral contract means the execution of the required task, the acceptance of
a bilateral contract means the creation of the required promise.
2 Note that when someone breaches a contract with a presumable agent it has to pay
more damages.
3 REMEDIES
The remedies described in this section try to equal the victim’s harm. In the
first three cases3, the system estimates the harm according to current market
conditions, while in the last case, the agents themselves compute the damages
and generate their own penalties.
Expectation Damages. The courts reward damages that place the victim of
breach in the position he or she would have been in if the other party had
performed the contract [?]. Therefore, in an ideal situation, the expectation dam-
ages does not affect the potential victims whether the contract is performed or
breached. Ideal expectation damages remain constant when the promisee relies
on the performance of the contract more than it is optimal.
Reliance Damages. Reliance increases the loss resulting from the breach of the
contract. Reliance damages put the victim in the same position after the breach
as if he had not signed a contract with the promisor or anyone else [?]. In
an ideal situation, the reliance damages do not affect the potential victims if
the contract is breached or there was no initial contract. No contract provides a
baseline for computing the injury. Using this baseline, the courts reward damages
that place the victims in the position that they would have been, if they had
never contracted with another agent. Reliance damages represent the difference
between profit if there is no contract and the current profit.
Opportunity Cost. Signing a contract often entails the loss of an opportunity to
make an alternative. The lost opportunity provides a baseline for computing the
damage. Using this baseline, the courts reward damages that place victims of
breach in the position that they would have been if they had signed the contract
that would have been the best alternative to the one that was breached [?]. In
the ideal situation, the opportunity cost damages does not affect the potential
victims whether the contract is breached or the best alternative contract is per-
formed4. If breach causes the injured party to purchase a substitute item, the
opportunity cost formula equals the difference between the best alternative con-
tract price available at the time of contracting and the price of the substitute
item obtained after the breach.
Party-Designed Remedies. The contract might stipulate a sum of money that
the breaker will pay to the party without guilt. These ”leveled commitment
contracts” [?] allow self-interested agents to face the events that unfolded since
the contract started. A rational person damages others whenever the benefit is
large enough to pay an ideal compensation and have some profit, as required to
3 Expectation damages, reliance damages and opportunity cost are analyzed from an
economical point of view in [?,?].
4 Opportunity cost and expectation damages approach equality as markets approach
perfect competition.
increase efficiency. Game theoretic analysis has shown that leveled committed
contracts increase the Pareto efficiency. One contract may charge a high price and
offer to pay high damages if the seller fails to deliver the goods, while another
contract may charge a low price and offer to pay low damages, the types of
contracts separating the set of buyers and allowing ”price discrimination.”
4 CASE ANALYSIS
The conclusions from the last sections are: (i) The amount of expectation dam-
ages must place the victim in the same position as if the actual contract had
been performed; (ii) The amount of reliance damages must place the victim in the
same position as if no contract had been signed; (iii) The amount of opportunity-
cost damages must place the victim in the same position as if the best alternative
contract had been performed; (iv) Party designed remedies specify themselves
the amount of damages in case of a breach.
4.1 No substitute
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Fig. 2. Supplier-Consumer contract
Supplier-Consumer
The consumer breaches the contract. In fig. 2a) the suppliers s5 and s6 want to
sell good g5 at price 11 and respectively 13, while the agents p5, and c3 try to
buy it at prices 12 and 15. According to (M+1)st price protocol the transaction
price is Pc = 12$
5. The auction clears at every round. In fig. 2b) a single uni-
lateral contract is signed: C1g5 =≺ s5, c3, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻. Consider c3
breaches the contract. In this case, the remedies will be: i) Expectation damages :
if the agent c3 performs, the s5’s estimated profit is the difference between the
5 The goods are transacted using the (M+1)st price auction protocol, which has the
property to balance the offer and the demand at each level in the supply chain
(otherwise the supply demand equilibrium cannot be achieved globally). It provides
a uniform price mechanism: all contracts determined by a particular clearing are
signed at the same price.
contract price Pc = 12 and its own valuation
6 vg5a6 = 11 (victim valuation). The
remedies compensate this value: De = Pc − vga. ; ii) Opportunity damages : first,
the auctioneer has to compute the opportunity cost Po, which is the transac-
tion cost in case the breacher was absent from the auction. In fig. 2, if agent c3
is not present Po = 11. The s5’s bid is one who wins. The contract would be
C1g5 =≺ s5, p5, g5, 11, tissue, tmaturity ≻ and the agent’s profit would be Po − v
g
a.
But, when there is no contract for agent s5, his profit would be null. The op-
portunity damages should reflect this. We define opportunity cost damage Do
which is received by the agent a as: Do = max(Po − vga, 0); iii) Reliance dam-
ages : if the victim does not have any input good, the supplier’s investments in
performing are null: Dr = 0; iv) Party-designed remedies : the remedies may be
a fraction from the contract price (Dp = α · Pc), a fraction from the expected
profit (Dp = α ·De), or constant (Dp = C).
The supplier breaches the contract. Consider s5 breaches contract C
1
g5
: i) Expec-
tation damages : De = v
g
a −Pc; ii) Opportunity damages : if the breacher had not
bid and the victim had signed a contract at the opportunity price Po, than it’s
profit would have been vga −Po. If the victim has no contract when the breacher
is not bidding, it receives no damages. Hence, Do = max(v
g
a − Po, 0). In the
depicted case, if the agent s5 had not existed, c3 would have signed a contract
with s6 for an opportunity cost Po = 12. Therefore, Do = 3; and iii) Reliance
damages : because the client does not produce any output goods, it’s reliance is
null: Dr = 0.
Supplier-Producer
The supplier breaches the contract. Consider the contract from fig. 3 C =≺
s5, p5, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻: i) Expectation damages: Observe that the victim
is a presumable agent because it has contracts for all its input goods. Its invest-
ments are Ip = 5+ 9 + 12 = 26 and I
g5
p = 9 + 5 = 14. The producer p5 has also
a contract for its output item, so Rp5 = 34. Its profit is Rp5 − Ip = 8. When bad
contracts have been signed this value can be negative, therefore no damages are
imposed. Otherwise, expectation damages equals the difference between its bid
and the contract price:
De =
{
max(Rp − Ip, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp
vgp − Pc, otherwise
Dr =
{
V gp − I
g
p +Rp − v
go
p , pˆ, ∃Rp
V gp − I
gk
p , otherwise
Do =


max(Rp − Igp − Po, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
vgp − Po, ¬pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
0, ¬∃Po
Recall pˆ means that agent p is presumable, go is the output good of the agent
p and Igkp represents all k contracts signed for input goods, where k < np. In the
6 (M+1)st price auction has the following property: the dominant strategy for each
agent is to reveal its real valuation.
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Fig. 3. Supplier-Producer contract
depicted case p5 is presumable and there is a contract with a buyer. Therefore, it
has to receive, as a victim, the next reliance damagesDr = V
g5
p5
−Ig5p5+Rp5−v
g6
p5
=
(10+5)− (9+5)+34− 32 = 3. In case of Opportunity costs damages, one seller
less implies Po ≥ Pc.
In some cases damages can be higher than the contract value itself (Dr ≥
Pc). According to current practice in law, these damages are the right ones if
the victim gives a previous notification about the risks faced by the potential
breacher. This is a clear situation when information propagation improves the
supply chain performance. In the light of the above facts, their reliance damages
should remain the mentioned ones if the victim has notified its partner, but
should be maxim Pc otherwise. Hence, we define D
′
r equalsDr when the breacher
receives a notice, and D′r = min(Dr, Pc), otherwise.
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Producer-Consumer
The consumer breaches the contract Consider the unilateral contract C =≺
p5, c2, g6, 34, tissue, tmaturity ≻ from fig. 4, where c2 breaches: i) In the case of
Expectation damages, p5 is presumable and De = 34− (12+ 9+5) = 8. Suppose
the agent p5 does not have any contract for one input good. Therefore, it is not
presumable and it will receive De = 34−32; ii) Reliance damages : Dr = Vp− Ip;
and iii) Opportunity cost : one buyer less implies Po ≤ Pc:
De =
{
max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ
Pc − vgp , otherwise
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po
Po − v
g
p , ¬pˆ, ∃Po
0, ∃Po)
4.2 Substitute
The common law requires the promisee to mitigate damages. Specifically, the
promisee must take reasonable actions to reduce losses occurred by the promisor’s
breach. The market can force the victim to find substitute items, in this case
the imposed damages reflect only the difference between original contract and
substitute contract. With a substitute contract, the victim signs for the identical
item, with the same deadline or tmaturity, but at a different price. Let Ps be the
value of the substitute contract. For the general case Producer-Producer, when
the buyer breaches the contract, the equations become:
De =


max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ, ¬∃Ps
Pc − vgp , pˆ, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps), ∃Ps
Dr =
{
Vp − Ip, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − vgp , 0), ¬pˆ,∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
5 DEMCA: A SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT FOR
CONTRACT BREACH EXPERIMENTS
5.1 System Architecture
Designing Electronic Markets for Contractual Agents (DEMCA) tool7 consists
of the next three components (figure 5):
Agents. For defining a contractual agent in DEMCA one has to instantiate
a generic agent with the following structure (figure 6). The type of the agent
identifies its role in the supply chain: supplier, producer, or consumer. The
agent’s strategy is defined by the function program, which points to a set of
7 Available at http://cs-gw.utcluj.ro/∼adrian/odr.html
Fig. 5. System architecture.
(defun generic_agent (name &optional (program (program name)) stored_items
active_contracts input_goods output_goods valuation_in
valuation_out money type))
(MAKE-agent :name name :type type :program program
:legal-actions ’(bid breach) :stored_items stored_items
:active_contracts active_contracts :score money
:input_goods input_goods :output_goods output_goods
:valuation_in valuation_in :valuation_out valuation_out))
Fig. 6. Agent’s structure in DEMCA.
temporalised defeasible rules coded in the TeDeLo (Temporal Defeasible Logic)
framework. Examples of strategies include: reactive/proactive agents, breaching
often/seldom agents, information propagation/hiding agents. The agent has a list
o percepts consisting in public information provided by the market: the current
open auctions, the existing bids, the agents, the public contracts. Each agent has
attributes keeping stored items, active contracts, or the amount of money avail-
able at the beginning of each experiment round (figure 6). Other information
that can be provided is: the goods which the agent is interested in achieving, the
good that the agent produces, the own valuation of these items. The public or
private character if these information depends on the current simulation.
Environment. The simulation environment introduces auctions for each item
within the market, to which the agents manifest their buying or selling interests.
The market is governed by a discrete time step. At the beginning of each round
the agent perceives the public information, and after a reasoning process, it
conveys one of the following actions: bid, breach, no action. A contract might
be signed in case the agent wins the M+1 price auction. If the agent has all
the necessary preconditions, the environment simulates the contract execution.
Otherwise, if the preconditions are not met at the time of maturity and no breach
action was executed, the environment automatically computes the amount of
remedy according to the legal doctrine in force.
The auctions run in parallel, following the same M+1 price protocol. After
the bids were sent, contracts are generated for the winning agents, the public
information being broadcasted to all the agents within the task dependency net-
work. The environment is responsible for computing the profit for each agent,
profit which includes the possible penalties. During DEMCA experiments five
types of remedies can be used: expectation damages, opportunity costs, reliance
damages, fixed penalty, and percentage from the contract value. The output of
the simulation is analysed by some scripts coded in R language, responsible for
generating graphics presenting the evolution of the agents’ score during experi-
ments.
Reasoning capabilities. The framework provides defeasible reasoning capa-
bilities to the DEMCA agents to flexibly represent market strategies under time
constraints and levels of certainty for handling preferences when deciding to
breach or not a contract. By enhancing agents with defeasible reasoning, they
are able to reason with incomplete information, including confidential contrac-
tual clauses. On the other hand, defeasible logic has already been proved to be
suitable for legal reasoning [?].
The expressivity of defeasible logic is given by three types of rules: Strict rules
are rules in the classical sense, that is whenever the premises are indisputable,
then so is the conclusion, while defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by
contrary evidence. For ”sending the goods means the goods were delivered”, if we
know that the goods were sent then they reach the destination, unless there is
other, not inferior, rule suggesting the contrary. Defeaters are rules that cannot
be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent some conclusions,
as in ”if the customer is a regular one and he has a short delay for paying, we
might not ask for penalties”. This rule cannot be used to support a ”not penalty”
conclusion, but it can prevent the derivation of the penalty conclusion. Defeaters
have a particular role in this context due to their capability to explicitly represent
exception, or contract breaches in our case.
Defeasible derivations have an argumentation like structure: firstly, we choose
a supported rule having the conclusions q we want to prove, secondly we consider
all the possible counterarguments against q, and finally we rebut all the above
counterarguments showing that, either some of their premises do not hold, or
the rule used for its derivation is weaker than the rule supporting the initial
conclusion q.
The TeDeLo (Temporal Defeasible Logic) module implements an extended
version of temporal defeasible logic ETDL, based on LISA (Lisp based Intelligent
Time step 1:
Agent S15, 100, NIL, NIL, (G5) perceives:
((#S(GOOD :NAME G5
:SELL_AGENTS (S15, 100, NIL, NIL, (G5))
:BUY_AGENTS (C4, 100, NIL, (G5), NIL)
:SELL_BIDS NIL
:BUY_BIDS NIL
:CONTRACT NIL)))
and does:
(((BID #S(GOOD :NAME G5
:SELL_AGENTS (S15, 100, NIL, NIL, (G5))
:BUY_AGENTS (C4, 100, NIL, (G5), NIL)
:SELL_BIDS NIL
:BUY_BIDS NIL
:CONTRACT NIL))))
Fig. 7. Trace of the agent’s percepts and actions in DEMCA.
Software Agents). Compared to the existing systems, the current implementation
extends the defeasible logic with: (1) temporal defeasible reasoning, (2) certainty
factor instead of a partial order relation, (3) open world assumption applied to
the rules, (4) dynamic rules, (5) dynamic priorities, (6) identifying of hidden
rules, (7) pattern of rules for representing cyclic events or facts, (8) rollback ac-
tivation to better handle exceptions. The formalism was extended with temporal
aspects in order to reason with contract deadlines. Dynamic rules and priorities
allow agents to adjust their market strategies according to the changes in the
environment.
5.2 Running scenarios
Basic Example In order to trace a simple scenario, two agents were added to
the framework, by calling the function add agent :
(add_agent ’reactive_agent ’s15 ’() ’() ’() ’(g5) 5 11 100)
(add_agent ’reactive_agent ’c4 ’() ’() ’(g5) ’() 15 16 100)
Here, the supplier s15 is interested in selling the item g5 for a minimum
price of 11 and needs 5 units to produce it, while the client c4 is interested in
buying the item g5 at a maximum price of 15, its own valuation being 16. At the
beginning of the experiment both agents have 100 monetary units and no stored
item.
Figure 7 presents part of a DEMCA session. During the first round, the
environment automatically starts an auction for the item g5. The agent s15
perceives this open auction, the list of agents which are interested in selling
the item (only itself in this case), the list of agents interested in buying it (the
consumer c4), the current buying or selling offers, at the output in case the
auction clears. Consider, the agent s15 has a reactive strategy, in which if it has
an item for selling and no active contract for it, the agent bids its own valuation
of the item. This is formalised as a defeasible theory as follows:
(defeasible ’r1 0.8 ’neg ’contract 1 1 ’poz bid 1 3)
(defeater ’r2 0.9 ’poz ’win 1 1 ’neg bid 2 3)
Here, the defeasible rule r1 supports with a certainty factor of 0.8 the consequent
bid for all time instances within the interval [1, 3] in case the agent has not signed
a contract for the desired item (’neg contract) during the first round. In defeasible
reasoning, the conclusion of a defeasible rule can be blocked by contrary evidence,
in case it has less degree of support. In the depicted case, the defeater r2 may
rebuttaly block the derivation of the bid consequent, by supporting the opposite
conclusion ’neg ’bid. In case the agent won the auction at timestep 1 (’win 1 1 ),
the bid action is no longer derived because the defeater r2 provides a stronger
degree of support. In DEMCA, one can dynamically adjust these parameters,
in order to tune the strategy to the market conditions. By using patterns of
rules facility provided by the platform, the agent can specify cyclic activations
of specific events.
Browsing the percepts sensed at the beginning of each round, the agent can
incorporate a part of them into his defeasible theory, using the function (fact
’neg ’contract 1.0 1 1), which stipulates that the agent does not have a contract
at round 1. Because the information is considered sure, the certainty factor of
this fact is set to 1.0. Having this fact asserted, the supplier s15, according to
rule r1, will execute the bid action (figure 7).
Large scale experiments First, the framework can be used as a tool for au-
tomated online dispute resolution (ODR). There are three situations: (i) The
market may have substantial authority, hence one remedy is imposed to all
agents. In this case, the amount of penalties can be automatically computed
with this framework; (ii) Consistent with party autonomy, the agents may set-
tle on different remedies at contracting time. This approach increases flexibility
and efficiency, because the agents are the ones who know what type of remedy
better protects their interests; (iii) All the above remedies influence the amount
of penalties : in this approach the role of the framework is to monitor the market
and collect data such as: the expected profit, the opportunity cost, the amount
of investments made, if there is a substitute at tbreach. All these information is
used as arguments when the dispute is arbitrated [?] in an architecture which
combines rule based reasoning (laws) and case based reasoning (precedent cases).
Second, knowing the bids, the actual contracts, the amount of potential reme-
dies, and the available offers on the market, the framework can identify situations
in which for both agents is more profitable to breach the contract when a for-
tunate or an unfortunate contingency appears. It computes pairs of suggestions,
helping to increase total welfare towards Pareto frontier.
Third, as a simulation tool, the market designer may obtain results regarding
the following questions: what types of remedies assure flexibility in the supply
chain? or how information sharing influences total revenues or can be used to
compute optimum reliance? In the developed prototype we are currently mak-
ing experiments with different types of agents: low-high reliance, breach often-
seldom, sharing information-not sharing, risk seeking-averse (when they are risk
averse, the penalties do not need to be so high to force breachers behave appro-
priately).
6 RELATED WORK
The task dependency network model was proposed [?] as an efficient market
mechanism in achieving supply chain coordination. The authors analyze pro-
tocols for agents to reallocate tasks for which they have no acquired rights.
However, this approach is rather a timeless-riskless economy. On real markets
a firm seldom signs contracts with its buyers and its suppliers simultaneously.
Moreover, the breach of a contract implies no penalties, which is an unrealistic
assumption in real world. In contrast, in the DEMCA framework auctions end
independently, and we introduce penalties in case of contract breaching.
The role of sanctions in multi-agent systems [?] is the enforcement of a so-
cial control mechanism for the satisfaction of commitments. We focus only on
material sanctions and we do not include social sanctions which affect trust,
credibility or reputation. Moreover, we have applied four types of material reme-
dies in a specific domain. In the same spirit of computing penalties according
to the level of harm produced, the amount of remedies may depend on the time
when the contract was breached [?]. Expectation damages, reliance damages,
and opportunity costs have also been studied [?,?,?] and how contracts influence
the supply chain coordination or strategic breach appear in [?,?].
Experiments regarding breach penalties were attacked from a game theory
viewpoint in [?]. The contract specifies decommitment penalties for both parties.
The resulting leveled commitment contracts enable agents to sign agreements
that would be inefficient in case of full commitment contracts. The efficiency
increases according to the fitness of the penalty to market conditions. Our hy-
pothesis is that, even if the amount is not known apriori the penalties introduced
in this paper can be proved efficiently because they perfectly reflect the environ-
ment conditions. Further experiments are required to validate this idea. There
are two issues using levelled commitment contracts in real life scenarios. On the
one hand, a contract has penalties associated to the main contractual clauses.
When a situation which has not been enclosed into the penalty clauses occurs,
the system still has to provide a mechanism of computing remedies. On the other
hand, the agents are legally bind to a penalty if there is a normative theory be-
yond that penalty. Otherwise, the agent can invoke many legal doctrines in order
to avoid a penalty. This is not the case in DEMCA framework. It is based on
such normative theory, and in case of unexpected exceptions one can apply legal
doctrines in order to compute the fair amount of penalty.
As commitments appear to be sometimes too restrictive (direct obligations)
and sometimes too flexible, enriched agents with defeasible reasoning mechanism,
the resulting defeasible commitments are more flexible than usual obligations
but also more constrained than permissions [?]. Dr-contract [?] also provides
defeasible reasoning mechanism for representing business rules. By introducing
temporised position, DEMCA framework can handle more realistic contracts
deadlines. Another difference consists in the contract representation, in our case
the contract is an extension of a social commitment in accordance with practice
in law: gratuitous promise, unilateral contract, bilateral contract. By introducing
defeasible logic when reasoning about commitments, we obtain two main advan-
tages. On the one hand, agents can reason with incomplete information. Also,
this property of nonmonotonic logics permits, in our case, to model confidential
contractual clauses. Expected exceptions can be captured by defining a prefer-
ence structure over the runs within the commitments dependency network [?].
Having the superiority relation from defeasible logic, we can easily define such a
structure in our framework.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduces the DEMCA framework for designing electronic markets
for contractual agents. While the amount of existing literature on e-commerce
focuses on contract negation or contract formation, we focus on the contract
breach phase during the lifecycle of a contract.
The contribution contains two ideas. On the one hand, we apply the princi-
ples of contract law in the task dependency network model [?]. As a result, we
enrich that model by including different types of penalties when agents breach,
thus bringing the model closer to the real world. On the other hand, the imple-
mented framework can be used for simulations when designed electronic markets,
knowing that the dispute resolution mechanism is a key factor in the success of
e-commerce applications [?]. Such a framework is useful for automated online
dispute resolution. The data obtained can be used as arguments in a mediated
dispute or the remedies can be computed in real time in case the agents agreed
with the market policy.
